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Music and Emotion in Victim-Impact
Evidence
ABSTRACT
Aristotle famously said that the "law is reason free from passion,"
and nothing arouses passion better than music. Thus when
victim-impact evidence evolved from simple oral statements to include
photographs, video footage, and musical clips, scholars and judges alike
expressed concern that music might be too emotional and may make it
difficult for the jury to make a rational decision based on logic rather
than feeling. Recent scholarship in the field of law and emotion,
however, notes that emotions are inevitable in law and further suggests
that these emotions can be used constructively in the legal system. Thus,
musically induced emotions may also have a role in the courtroom. By
carefully considering current music-and-emotion research and
analyzing the possible uses of music in victim-impact evidence, this Note
concludes that under the current standard, music can have probative
value to the jury, and suggests a framework for evaluating music in
victim-impact evidence on a case-by-case basis.
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Traditionally, during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, a
member of the victim's family would go before the court and read aloud
into the record a written statement of victim-impact evidence "to inform
the judge or jury of the financial, physical, and psychological impact of
the crime on the victim and the victim's family." 1 But with the
increasing availability of technology in courtrooms, the presentation of
victim-impact evidence has evolved to include photographs, home-video
footage, and now background music. 2 Scholars and judges alike have
expressed concern that permitting the use of music in victim-impact
evidence is unfair to the defendant because music is too emotional and
subjective and may make it difficult for the jury members to make their
decisions based on rational judgments rather than their feelings.
3
The current standard governing the admissibility of
victim-impact evidence restricts any evidence that would unduly
prejudice the jury and lead to an unfair trial.4 Thus, when determining
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
2. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 570 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1020
(2008).
3. See, e.g., Alicia N. Harden, Note, Drawing the Line at Pushing "Play" Barring Video
Montages as Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Trials, 99 KY. L.J. 845, 876 (2011)
("Recent scholarship has advocated for a bright-line rule barring musical accompaniment to victim
impact videos as the music is 'irrelevant and highly prejudicial' and results in prejudiced decision-
making and a fundamentally unfair trial."); Christine M. Kennedy, Note, Victim Impact Videos:
The New-Wave of Evidence in Capital Sentencing Hearings, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1069, 1101
(2008) ("Adding musical soundtracks to victim impact videos only exacerbates the arguably
inappropriate influence of emotions on capital sentencing. Music heightens the emotional
influence of the visuals generally and introduces more factors that ought to be irrelevant to the
sentencing decision." (citing John Booth Davies, The Psychology of Music 69-70 (1978))); Erica A.
Schroeder, Comment, Sounds of Prejudice: Background Music During Victim Impact Statements,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (2010) ("Iusic's powerful effect on emotion makes it a dangerous
addition to the supposedly logic-and-reason-based setting of a courtroom. This added emotion
makes it even more difficult for jurors to set aside their feelings and make rational decisions.").
4. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). It should be noted that victim-impact
evidence is subject to the same Federal Rules of Evidence as any other evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403
("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). Given the striking
similarity between Rule 403 and the Payne standard, this Note focuses exclusively on the judicial
interpretation of the Payne standard. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Kennedy, supra note 3 at
1081-82 ('Rule 403 is very favorable to admissibility; evidence, although relevant, may be




whether to permit the use of music in victim-impact evidence, courts
must determine whether emotionally evocative music reaches a
prejudicial level of emotion that would render the trial unfair. 5
Historically, Western civilizations considered emotions irrational and
uncontrollable responses that contaminated the pragmatism and
fairness of reason. 6 In an effort to ensure fair and non-arbitrary
decisions, the US legal system idealized the emotionless judge-one
unaffected by the sentiments of the parties, the public, or
herself-making decisions based solely on facts.
7
Because music evokes and intensifies emotion, 8 courts must
consider how the use of music in victim-impact evidence introduces
emotional elements into juries' decisions. 9 However, critiques of music
in victim-impact evidence as an ill-advised deviation from proper legal
objectivity typically rely on the flawed assumption that emotions have
no role in law. 10 On the contrary, current scholarship recognizes that
''emotions are ubiquitous in law" and suggests that emotions can be
used constructively in the legal system.11 If emotions are necessarily
and effectively a part of the courtroom experience, musically induced
emotions may also have a role to play in victim-impact evidence.12
Part I of this Note presents the history of victim-impact evidence
and outlines the current standard for evaluating the admissibility of
victim-impact evidence. Part II examines recent challenges to the
underlying assumption that emotion, and by extension music, has no
role in law. Part III examines recent music-and-emotion scholarship
5. See id.; Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020, 1027 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that victim-impact videos can render a strong "purely emotional impact that may call due
process protections into play").
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (2009); Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial
Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 634-36 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Judicial Dispassion].
7. See Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 635-36.
8. E.g. Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, in MUSICAL PERCEPTIONS 3,
10 (Rita Aiello & John A. Sloboda eds., 1994); Ian Cross & Elizabeth Tolbert, Music and Meaning,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MUSIC PSYCHOLOGY 24, 26-28 (Susan Hallam et al. eds., 2009).
9. See, e.g., Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. at 1025 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[WMhen victim
impact evidence is enhanced with music, photographs, or video footage, the risk of unfair prejudice
quickly becomes overwhelming.").
10. See, e.g., Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 643-45; see also Regina
Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should be Made of Victim Impact
Videos?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 979, 1015 (2010) (reasoning that sometimes music should be allowed
in victim-impact evidence, but "only if it has a factual basis in the victim's tastes, preferences,
activities, hobbies, or behavior, or in the relationship between the victim and her or his survivors").
11. Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 642-43; see discussion infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
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and presents a framework for analyzing music's emotional impact. Part
IV considers when the use of music in victim-impact evidence-as
background music, victim-created music, or victim-specific music-may
be appropriate under the controlling standard. Finally, Part V
concludes that courts should not ban music from victim-impact evidence
simply because it is emotional. Rather, in evaluating whether the
victim-impact evidence is "unduly prejudicial," courts should consider
whether specific musical components of victim-impact evidence help
demonstrate the uniqueness of the victim or the blameworthiness of the
defendant.
I. THE PAYNE STANDARD FOR VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court established the current standard for
admissibility of victim-impact evidence in Payne v. Tennessee, holding
that states may permit victim-impact evidence during a criminal trial
if it is relevant to the jury's verdict. 13 The first prong of the Payne
standard requires that victim-impact evidence "inform the sentencing
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question," 14
either by (1) portraying the victim as "an individual whose death
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to [the victim's]
family" or (2) providing the jury with information about the defendant's
"moral culpability and blameworthiness." 15 If victim-impact evidence
can satisfy either of these qualifications, the second prong of Payne
involves a due process inquiry that would preclude victim-impact
evidence "in the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair."16 Despite
these seemingly straightforward steps, the Payne standard is notably
broad.17
13. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991) (6-3 decision).
14. Id. at 825.
15. See id. ('We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury
to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have
before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.").
16. Id. (citation omitted). It should be noted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the only other limitation on the use of victim-impact evidence
recognized in Payne. See id. at 827 (holding that the Eighth Amendment "erects no per se bar" to
the admittance of victim-impact evidence).
17. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital
Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 266-67 (2003) ("What other evidence may the sentence hear? Are




Specifically, Payne's lack of clear direction left many
unanswered questions for courts about how to apply Payne and what
procedural safeguards-if any-might be needed to protect
defendants.18 Payne permits victim-impact evidence to give the jury a
"quick glimpse of the [victim's] life," but courts have yet to define what
constitutes a "quick glimpse."19 Although Payne does not require states
to admit victim-impact evidence during sentencing, the majority of
states do allow it and few impose any substantive or procedural limits
regarding what can be admitted.20 Further, while Payne only dealt with
the admission of oral statements by victims' family members, 21
subsequent cases have interpreted Payne broadly and permitted videos,
photographs, and even background music in victim-impact evidence.
22
A. Applying Payne to Music: People v. Kelly
In People v. Kelly, the California Supreme Court upheld the
admission of a victim-impact video during sentencing after a jury
convicted Douglas Oliver Kelly for the murder of nineteen-year-old Sara
Weir. 23 The victim-impact video featured photographs and film footage
of "Sara" throughout her life with soft music by Enya playing in the
background and her mother narrating. 24 After the jury sentenced him
to death, Kelly appealed, contending that the trial court should not have
admitted the videotape as victim-impact evidence.
25
Upholding the admission of the video, the California Supreme
Court noted that under Payne, victim-impact evidence is only barred if
18. Id.
19. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822; see id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Kelly v.
California, 555 U.S. 1020, 1024 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Blume, supra note 17, at 267.
20. See Blume, supra note 17, at 267-68 (noting that of the thirty-eight states with capital
punishment, thirty-three states along with the federal government and military permit victim-
impact evidence in capital trials).
21. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-15.
22. E.g., People v. Bramit, 210 P.3d 1171, 1187 (Cal. 2009) (permitting a videotape as
victim-impact evidence); People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 48 (Cal. 2009) (permitting a video as victim-
impact evidence); People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 570-72 (Cal. 2007) (permitting a video with
background music as victim-impact evidence); State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 466-67 (Idaho Ct. App.
2006) (permitting a DVD presentation of video and photographic images with background music
as victim-impact evidence).
23. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 567-72 (Cal. 2007).
24. Id. at 570; see Ben Winograd, Petition Preview: Enya, the Death Penalty, and Video
Victim Impact Evidence, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 20, 2008, 1:11 AM), www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/kellyvideo.mpg.
25. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 552, 568.
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it is so prejudicial that it renders the trial "fundamentally unfair."26
The court dismissed the idea that videos are inherently prejudicial,
emphasizing that problems arise from factors such as the length of the
video, an extensive focus on an adult victim's childhood, or the use of
"stirring music." 27 In such situations, courts "must strictly analyze" the
victim-impact evidence and "monitor the jurors' reactions to ensure that
the proceedings do not become injected with a legally impermissible
level of emotion."28
After concluding that the general emotional content in the
victim-impact video was not "unduly prejudicial" and that the video was
permissible, the California Supreme Court went on to address serious
reservations about the use of music in such videos. 29 The court
conceded that music is not automatically barred from use in
victim-impact evidence, especially when it "factually and realistically
portray[s] the victim's life and character." 30 Background music,
however, is problematic because it may "enhance the emotion of the
factual presentation" without adding any relevant facts.
31
This question of music's appropriateness in victim-impact
evidence has not been resolved in the cases following Kelly.32 Although
courts have tended to err on the side of excluding music due to its
emotional content, little uniformity has been achieved beyond the
consistent acknowledgment of music as emotional and therefore
troubling.
33
26. Id. at 568 (quoting People v. Lewis, 140 P.3d 775, 840 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Payne, 501
US at 825)).
27. See id. at 569 (reasoning that these factors in particular risk "creating an emotional
impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs
of the victim or listening to the victim's bereaved parents" (quoting People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015,
1093 (2007))).
28. Id. at 570 (quoting Prince, 156 P.3d at 1093).
29. See id. at 571-72 (acknowledging that the background music in the video "may have
added an irrelevant factor to the videotape," given that it had no relevance to the case aside from
it being some of the victim's favorite music).
30. Id. at 571.
31. See id.
32. Compare id. (allowing the use of a victim-impact video with background music), with
People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105, 134, 136 (Cal. 2008) (allowing the use of photographic images in
a victim-impact video, but finding that the audio portion, which consisted of music and narration,
was "unduly prejudicial" and could not be played during the sentencing).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 191-93 (D. Mass. 2004)
(denying admittance of a victim-impact video set to the "poignant music" of The Beatles and James
Taylor, reasoning that the twenty-seven minute video was better suited for its original purpose as
a memorial film); Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 333-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (finding the trial
court erred in admitting a victim-impact video featuring Celine Dion's 'My Heart Will Go On"
[Vol. 16:1:169174
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B. The Supreme Court Responds
Despite the controversy surrounding victim-impact evidence
and the ambiguity regarding Payne's scope and limits, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Kelly. 34 In his dissent from the denial of
certiorari, Justice Stevens argued that victim-impact videos are far
from what the Court contemplated in Payne.35 The addition of video
and music to victim-impact evidence, he contended, adds "nothing
relevant" to assist the jury's decision making and only serves to increase
the risk that the jury's decision will be based on emotions rather than
reason.36
Justice Breyer also dissented from the denial of certiorari. 37
Although he conceded that some videos are useful to the jury in
determining the blameworthiness of the defendant, Justice Breyer
agreed with Justice Stevens that certain emotional elements are simply
too risky and cautioned against the "personal, emotional, and artistic
attributes" of a victim-impact video. 38 He continued, noting that
emotional elements, such as music, only enhance the "purely emotional"
impact of the video and "tell the jury little or nothing about the crime's
'circumstances."' 39 However, a closer examination of musically-induced
emotions reveals that music can, at times, reveal something.40
II. CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS: LAW AND EMOTION
Central to both Justice Stevens's and Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinions in Kelly is the assumption that emotion has little or no role in
the legal system.41 Because certain media, including music, can affect
emotions, some critics have gone so far as to call for a bright-line ban
against victim-impact videos, arguing that by permitting the
because of its "extraordinarily emotional" quality and the music's amplification of that effect). But
see State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 467 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (permitting a victim-impact video with
background music, reasoning that the music was not "unduly inflammatory or manifestly unjust").
34. Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020, 1020 (2008).
35. See id. at 1025-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1025.
37. Id. at 1026 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1026-27.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. at 1025-26. (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1026-27
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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combination of the film and the background music, "courts are
permitting jurors to befriend the victim in emotionally charged ways."
42
The idea that emotions are "more primitive, less intelligent,
more bestial, less dependable, and more dangerous than reason,"43 is so
embedded in the US legal system that most judges do not even question
the premise that emotion has no role in law and that judges and juries'
decisions should be based solely on reason.44 The subsequent cases
interpreting the Payne standard highlight this presumption. 45
Recent law and emotion scholarship, however, suggests that far
from detracting from reason, emotions are useful, even necessary, to
rational decision making.46 In contrast to the traditional theory that
law should be free from emotions, which are "unthinking" and contrary
to reason, cognitive theory suggests that every emotion is based on an
individual's "underlying belief structure" about the world and
"embodies thought, often complex thought," about that individual's
beliefs, which can be analyzed like any other thought.
47
Understanding an emotional response, such as anger towards a
defendant in a murder trial, can reveal the thought processes and belief
42. E.g., Harden, supra note 3, at 848, 866-67 ('This Note advocates for the adoption a
bright-line rule against video montages as victim impact evidence in capital punishment
sentencing trials because victim impact videos result in fundamentally unfair trials, are outside
the scope of the Court's holding in Payne [sic], and are irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.").
43. Robert C. Solomon, The Philosophy of Emotion, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMOTION 3, 3
(Michael Lewis et al. eds., 2010).
44. See Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 632; see also, e.g., People v. Prince,
156 P.3d 1015, 1093 (Cal. 2007).
45. See, e.g., Prince, 156 P.3d at 1093 (reasoning that courts must ensure victim-impact
evidence does not involve a "legally impermissible level of emotion" thereby becoming unduly
prejudicial).
46. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 6, at 2004 ("Law and emotions scholars challenged
this entrenched understanding with two kinds of arguments. The first was a descriptive claim:
emotions already infuse decision making whether or not they are recognized by legal actors. The
second, and perhaps more central, argument was normative. Legal decision making is enriched
and refined by the operation of emotions because they direct attention to particular dimensions of
a case, or shape decision makers' ability to understand the perspective of, or the stakes of a decision
for, a particular party."); Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 642 ("First, emotions are
ubiquitous in law. Second, and more importantly, emotion is not necessarily--or even usually-a
pernicious influence. Emotion reveals reasons, motivates action in service of reasons, enables
reason, and is educable.").
47. Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 6, at 643-44 ("If the traditional legal view
is that emotions are 'unthinking, opposed to reason in some very strong and primitive way,' just
'mindless surges of affect,' the cognitive theory responds that emotions embody beliefs about its
objects." (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 23, 24 (1996))).
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structure that shapes an individual's decision making. 48 Perhaps a
juror's anger stems from racial prejudice, or memories of a personal
experience, or the defendant's behavior, or a particular belief about how
justice should be exacted. 49 Once that emotional response is
understood, the individual experiencing the emotion can evaluate it and
respond appropriately to the triggering stimulus and the legal context.50
Thus, emotions are a part of rational decision making and are present
in law, even if they remain underexamined.5 1
This developing understanding of the roles that emotion
necessarily plays in trials weighs against a crude blanket ban on music
as a component of victim-impact testimony.52 If emotions have a role
in law, emotionally evocative music may also have a place because
it too can reflect underlying beliefs and reveal complex
thought patterns. 53 A bright-line rule barring music from
victim-impact evidence is not a satisfying solution because it fails to
recognize the instances where music conforms to the Payne standard.54
Rather, examining how music elicits and informs emotions
creates a foundation for analyzing the use of music in
victim-impact evidence under the standard set forth in Payne.55
III. THE EMOTIONS OF MUSIC
Music is renown for its ability to shape emotions. 56 Yet despite
music's unquestioned emotional impact, scholars have experienced
considerable difficulty seriously investigating the relationship between
48. See id. at 644-45.
49. See id. at 644.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 649.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. Cf. Harden, supra note 3, at 876 (arguing that a bright-line rule barring both musical
accompaniment in victim-impact evidence and the use of a video format is necessary to prevent
the "emotional impact factor of individual components" and "ensuren rational and
even-handed decision making").
55. See infra Parts II.B, IV.
56. See Meyer, supra note 8, at 10 ("From Plato down to the most recent discussions of
aesthetics and the meaning of music, philosophers and critics have, with few exceptions, affirmed
their belief in the ability of music to evoke emotional responses in listeners."); Patrik N. Juslin &
John A. Sloboda, Music and Emotion: Introduction, in MUSIC AND EMOTION: THEORY AND
RESEARCH 3, 3 (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2001) [hereinafter Juslin & Sloboda,
Introduction] (noting that most people, regardless of culture or age, experience music and its
emotional effects every day).
20131
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music and emotion. 57 This is a challenging topic, not only because
emotions are difficult to study scientifically, but also because the field
still lacks a unifying theoretical framework. 58 For example, some
suggest that music can induce emotion by the sheer force of its presence,
similar to how a "snake might induce fear in someone...
independently of whether or not the person concerned had it in mind to
feel fear."59 Others argue that music is simply a tool the listener can
use to "generate an emotional experience," and without the listener's
decision to feel a particular emotion, the music would have no emotional
effect at all.60
This dichotomy is particularly relevant to the questions of
law-and-emotion scholarship and music's role in victim-impact evidence
because it presents two possible ways of understanding
musically-induced emotions. 61 If an individual hearing music has no
control over the emotional effects, then critics are correct to view
music's emotional power as uncontrollable and prejudicial. 62 If,
however, an individual is even partially in control of emotionally
interpreting the music she hears, then recent law-and-emotion
scholarship suggests that those emotions could be analyzed and
controlled by the listener, thus creating an appropriate place for music
in victim-impact evidence. 63
A. Challenges in Understanding Music-Induced Emotions
These theories of music-induced emotions represent two distinct
approaches to understanding music and emotions: the traditional
"receptive" model involving a passive listener sitting quietly
experiencing involuntary emotions in the concert hall and a
57. Juslin & Sloboda, Introduction, supra note 56, at 3-5 ("The most authoritative
handbook of music psychology to appear thus far, The psychology of music (Deutsch 1999) [sic],
does not include a chapter on emotion. Similarly, the most extensive handbook on emotion yet to
appear, Handbook of emotions (Lewis & Haviland-Jones 2000) [sic], also does not contain a chapter
on music.").
58. See id. at 4-5 ("Where has been a tendency for many researchers to think that the
problem of music and emotion is so complex that they would prefer to avoid it altogether-rather
than dealing with the problem inadequately, it is better not dealing with it at all.").
59. See Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda, Music and Emotion: Commentary, in MusIc
AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 453 (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda eds., 2001)







contemporary "constructive" model in which the listener is now the
"agent who makes emotion happen" by managing the nexus of
influences. 64 Aligning with the receptive model, classical Greek
philosophy believed that music could move people's passions by its
rousing beauty, sharing reason's ability to "bend human minds and
actions to the purposes of the orator." 65  More recently, however,
musicologists and sociologists have embraced the constructive idea of
music-that musical meaning varies across cultures and depends on
social context.66 Yet while the constructive model has transformed the
contemporary approach to understanding music and emotion, scholars
must still contend with the longstanding belief that musically induced
emotions are irrational, illustrating the difficulties of creating a
uniform theoretical framework.6
7
Another difficulty for scholars examining emotion in music is
that even within the same framework, the experience of music is
subjective. Indeed, the specific emotion felt, the level of emotion, and
the understanding of the emotion will vary from person to person
depending on different contextual factors that influence and control an
individual.68 Even something as slight as a person's general mood can
determine how much emotion that individual will experience when
listening to music. 6 9 Thus, at the core of any discussion regarding
potential roles for music in victim-impact evidence, fully understanding
the relationship between music and emotion remains a challenge. 70
B. Analyzing Emotional Responses to Music
Despite the lack of a uniform theoretical framework and the
inherently subjective nature of experiencing emotionally evocative
music, scholars have identified intrinsic and extrinsic musical factors
that, when compiled and refined, shed considerable light on the
experience of music and emotion in the context of victim-impact
64. See id. at 453-54.
65. See Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 26.
66. See id. at 29 (suggesting that music's meaning emerges from the "processes and
conditions that pertain to the contexts within which music is produced and received").
67. See Juslin & Sloboda, Commentary, supra note 59, at 453-54.
68. See JAMES L. MURSELL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC 201 (1st ed., 1937).
69. See JOHN SLOBODA, EXPLORING THE MUSICAL MIND: COGNITION, EMOTION, ABILITY,
FUNCTION 208 (2005).
70. See infra Part III.
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evidence.71 Studies have found that the intrinsic musical elements of
tempo, volume, and timbre are the most effective at consistently
conveying emotions.72 The most significant extrinsic factors that shape
the listener's perception of music include conditioning, visual
association, anticipation, and social context.73
1. Emotion-Inducing Elements Intrinsic to Music
Within any piece of music, any given musical element can affect
the listener's emotional experience and can evoke many different
emotions depending on the context and on the element's relationship to
the other musical elements. 74 For example, while musical mode 75 is
often perceived as either happy or sad, tempo can overrule this set of
associations, exerting a greater emotional impact on most listeners. 76
Although measuring the effect of internal musical elements is
extremely difficult and subjective, scholars have identified that tempo,
volume, and timbre generally have the clearest and most consistent
emotional effects-an increase in any of these factors, making the music
faster, louder, or higher in pitch, resulted in an increase in emotional
activation and the perception of happiness or excitement. 77
Interestingly, these internal elements highlight similarities between
music, which uses changes in pitch, tempo, and volume to express
emotion, and the human voice, which expresses emotion by
"modulations of the tone."78 This has led some scholars to suggest that
71. See, e.g., Patrik N. Juslin & Daniel Vistfiill, Emotional Responses to Music: The Need
to Consider Underlying Mechanisms, 31 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCi. 559, 563-68 (2008); MURSELL, supra
note 68, at 201-16.
72. See Alf Gabrielsson, The Relationship Between Musical Structure and Perceived
Expression, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MUSIC PSYCHOLOGY 145 (Susan Hallam et al. eds.,
2009).
73. See MURSELL, supra note 68, at 201-10; Juslin & VaistfJill, supra note 71, at
563-67.
74. See Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 143-45.
75. 'Mode" defines a particular set of notes at specified tonal intervals upon which
melodies and harmonies are built. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, (Michael Kennedy ed., 2nd
ed. rev. 2006), available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
76. See Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 143-45. In other words, if a minor mode piece,
which is often perceived as sad, is set to a quick tempo, which is often perceived as happy, the
heightened pulse of the music may shift the perception from one of sadness to one of happiness.
See id.
77. See id. at 145.
78. Isabelle Peretz, Listen to the Brain: A Biological Perspective on Musical Emotions, in




certain vocal expression cues used to convey emotion can be mimicked
in music and similarly used to convey emotion. 79 Others, however,
dispute the extent to which this claim can be applied, citing the highly
specialized and complex neural organization humans use to understand
verbal cues. 80 Still, the theory that certain aspects of vocal
communication translate to music does help explain the relatively
consistent emotional response to specific musical elements such as
tempo and loudness.
81
These internal musical elements provide a general
understanding of how the musical structure of a song can affect
individuals in the context of victim-impact evidence.8 2 But in isolation,
the internal elements do not reveal much because the listener's
emotional experience depends on interaction with external factors.
83
2. Emotion-Inducing Factors External to Music
While intrinsic, sonic features of music tend to produce certain
consistent (if variable) reactions in most listeners, other extrinsic
factors also influence listeners' emotional reactions.8 4 These factors
include (1) emotional conditioning, (2) visual association,
(3) anticipation, and (4) social context.
8 5
The first external factor, emotional conditioning, is the process
by which "an emotion is induced by a piece of music simply because this
stimulus has been paired repeatedly with other positive or negative
stimuli." 86 For example, if a particular song often plays
contemporaneously with times when the listener meets her boyfriend,
the repeated pairings of the song and her love for her boyfriend may
become associated with the happiness derived from the relationship.
8 7
Conditioning also takes place at a cultural level as general styles
of music, such as soft, slow, and melodic music, serve as a shorthand for
specific emotion, such as sadness. 88 This process, known as
79. See id. at 124.
80. See id.
81. See id.; Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 145.
82. See Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 143-45.
83. See id. at 141.
84. See Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 143-45.
85. See id.
86. See Juslin & V~ist l11, supra note 71, at 564.
87. See id.
88. See JOHN BOOTH DAVIES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MuSic 70 (1978).
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"generalization," can cause a listener to "experience an emotion to a
piece of music which he has not heard before."8 9 Unlike most forms of
classic conditioning, generalization often happens without the
listener's awareness and is particularly resistant to extinction. 90
Emotional conditioning, especially generalization, may be particularly
relevant to the analysis of background music in
victim-impact evidence that is being used to set the mood for the video. 91
The second external factor, visual association, applies when a
listener imagines any given image while listening to music and
experiences an emotion associated with that image. 92 Studies have
indicated that different individuals associate different types of images
with different types of emotions, making it possible for mental images
to function as "internal triggers" to emotions. 93 Listeners tend to have
the same emotional responses to these imagined mental images as they
would to similar "real-world" visual stimuli. 94 While musical
conditioning is often unconscious, listeners can control visual
associations by summoning and dismissing images at will, thereby
enabling the listener to control the music-induced emotions. 95
Yet studies have shown that imagined visual images are
"strongly influenced or shaped by the unfolding structure of the
music." 96 For example, one study revealed that twenty-four subjects
listening to various musical selections imagined extremely varied
visual images but experienced "comparatively constant" moods when
listening to each musical selection.97 Thus, the relationship between
the music and the listener's imagined image raises a
chicken-or-the-egg question about the relationship between the
imagined images and the experienced emotion.98 Scholars still debate
whether the imagined image enables the listener to constructively
manipulate her emotions by purposefully evoking particular mental
89. See id. at 69-70.
90. See Juslin & Vastqdll, supra note 71, at 564-65.
91. Compare United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 191-93 (D. Mass. 2004)
(finding a victim-impact video with "poignant" background music to be unduly prejudicial), with
State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 467 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (reasoning that the background music in
this victim-impact video was not unduly prejudicial).
92. See Juslin & ViistfJill, supra note 71, at 566; MURSELL, supra note 68, at 206.
93. See Juslin & Vast jll, supra note 71, at 566.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 567.
96. See id.




images or whether the experienced emotion prompts the listener to
respond reflectively to music's emotional force by imagining a
particular kind of image.99 Regardless of whether images induce the
emotion experienced while listening to music or whether the
music-induced emotion prompts the imagined image, visual association
is an important external factor because it recognizes the powerful
interplay between visual and aural stimulation-a relationship that is
often present in victim-impact videos that include both photos of the
victim and music. 100
The third external factor, anticipation, is a highly constructive
factor premised on the assumption that music has no inherent meaning
and that the listener derives musical meaning largely from personal
expectations, experiences, prejudices, or beliefs. 10 1 Once a listener has
particular expectations about a musical experience, whether those
expectations are derived from personal history or cultural norms,
nearly every musical phrase will appear to have meaning precisely
because the listener may interpret the music in a way that fits within
the listener's anticipated framework. 10 2 Anticipation is a critical factor
for understanding music's legal implications because jurors'
expectations of victim-impact videos may shape their experience of the
actual videos, leading them to interpret any music to emotionally
reinforce those expectations. 
103
Finally, scholars and historians have long acknowledged music's
ability to coordinate the emotions of a group and intensify the
individual listener's emotions. 104 Consequently, the fourth external
factor, social context, is one of the most significant musical factors
because jurors will view victim-impact evidence in a group context,
which can even alter and intensify the emotion a listener experiences.
10 5
Indeed, the social context of a musical experience can shape the
99. See infra Part IV.
100. See Juslin & Vdstfidll, supra note 71, at 566-67; MURSELL, supra note 68, at
207-08.
101. See Peter Vuust & Chris D. Frith, Anticipation is the Key to Understanding Music
and the Effects of Music on Emotion, 31 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 599, 599-600 (2008) (advocating for
a theoretical framework "with music anticipation as the guiding mechanism").
102. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 62, 79.
103. See id.
104. See SLOBODA, supra note 69, at 358; ANTHONY STORR, MUSIC AND THE MIND 24, 30-
31, 41-46 (1992) (observing that the ancient Greeks used music to boost the morale of men during
war and Adolf Hitler used music to rouse crowds into excitement before his speeches).
105. See, e.g., W. Ray Crozier, Music and Social Influence, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
MUSIC 68-73 (David J. Hargreaves & Adrian C. North eds., 1997); STORR, supra note 104, at 24.
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listener's anticipated emotional responses through the disposition of
others nearby or the particular private or public environment. 06 The
power of context can be so strong that the listener might try to override
a personal predisposition in order to match what is deemed
appropriate. 107
In addition to the influence of social context on a listener's
emotional experience, a collective listening environment often causes
listeners to experience strong emotions at the same moments, guided
by the music. 1 08 This collective musical experience can also pressure an
individual listener to conform to the group. 109 From a young age,
humans look to others for social cues about how to respond, ready to
catch the contagious emotions seen in others.110 Because individuals
often look to a social group for approval, an individual may suppress or
keep private a personal opinion or emotional experience "to appear
neutral concerning a majority view."' Thus, the social context of
music can have profound influence on individual listeners' emotional
experiences, either by heightening their emotions in a group context or
by pressuring them to conform or conceal their true emotions to align
with the group's expectations. 112
In sum, a survey of music-and-emotion scholarship affirms that
music can powerfully affect emotions through factors such as harmonic
structure, emotional conditioning, visual association, and social context
to name a few. 113 But the inclination to automatically prohibit music
from victim-impact evidence on the grounds that it affects emotions is
too hasty because it is based on the assumption that emotions cannot
be useful or regulated in law and because it fails to consider the benefits
that music offers victim-impact evidence.114
106. See Crozier, supra note 105, at 68; DAVIES, supra note 88, at 62; STORR, supra note
104, at 24.
107. Crozier, supra note 105, at 68.
108. See SLOBODA, supra note 69, at 358; STORR, supra note 104, at 30-31.
109. See Crozier, supra note 105, at 68.
110. See Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda, Psychological Perspectives on Music and
Emotion, in MusIc AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 86 (Patrik N. Juslin & John A. Sloboda
eds., 2001).
111. See Crozier, supra note 105, at 71.
112. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 71-72; Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 29.
113. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 79; Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 30-31.
114. See infra Part V.
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IV. MUSIC IN VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT
Critics of music in victim-impact evidence worry that music
heightens the jurors' emotional experience, making it "even more
difficult for jurors to set aside their feelings," which in turn both
decreases their collective capacity to make a rational judgment and
introduces an unfair degree of subjectivity into the proceedings. 115 For
example, a particular song playing in the background of a victim-impact
video might have special emotional salience to one juror that could taint
that juror's judgment, either by introducing an inappropriate and
irrelevant emotion to the juror's consciousness or by increasing the
illusory perception of similarity between the juror and the victim.
116
While critics are correct to observe that music can be highly
emotional, 117 they are wrong to assume that "[m]usic has no probative
value [or that] it provides no relevant information regarding the
victim's uniqueness or the harm caused that cannot be expressed
through spoken testimony."1 1 8 This assumption is axiomatic of the
tendency to treat all possible uses of music in victim-impact evidence as
having the same degree of relevance. 119 But this is an oversimplified
approach that fails to recognize that emotionally evocative music may
be relevant to victim-impact evidence at certain times.1 20 By examining
the uses of music in victim-impact evidence and categorically
evaluating the appropriateness of these uses under the Payne standard,
courts will be better able to determine when music should not be
permitted in victim-impact evidence and when music has probative
value and can be equitably used in victim-impact evidence.
121
115. Schroeder, supra note 3, at 473, 478; see, e.g., Harden, supra note 3, at 863 ("[Wlhen
musical accompaniment is added, the effect of the visual images is exacerbated; particular songs
can arouse emotional memories in jurors to the detriment of their rational decision-making
capability."); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1102 ("Adding a musical soundtrack to a victim impact
movie, therefore, poses a substantial risk that the specific tune used will elicit in the jurors a
memory of the last time they heard the particular song or one like it, and/or may lead them to
associate the song with the event in which it is usually used.").
116. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1102 ("Adding a musical soundtrack to a victim impact
movie, therefore, poses a substantial risk that the specific tune used will elicit in the jurors a
memory of the last time they heard the particular song or one like it, and/or may lead them to
associate the song with the event in which it is usually used.").
117. See supra Part III.
118. Schroeder, supra note 3, at 503.
119. See, e.g., id.
120. See infra Part IV.B-C.
121. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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An analysis of the three major categories of music found in
victim-impact evidence under the Payne standard reveals that generic
background music with no particular relevance to the victim most likely
fails under both prongs of Payne.122 Victim-created music, however,
should be allowed in victim-impact evidence as it clearly reflects the
uniqueness of the victim and is not "unduly prejudicial." 123 Finally,
music that has special significance or relevance to the victim or the
victim's family should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, because it




The most common form of music in victim-impact evidence is
background music-a song playing softly while the jury views pictures
of the victim and listens to a narrated statement. 125 Courts have
wrestled with whether background music is "unduly prejudicial" and
whether it even serves an appropriate function under the Payne
standard without reaching a consistent conclusion. 126
One of the major problems with background music under the
Payne standard is the subjectivity surrounding each individual's
emotional experience of music. 127 Jurors are human beings with
complex emotional histories, and each may have previous emotional
experiences with a song presented in a victim-impact video, regardless
of the appropriateness of that response in the courtroom proceedings or
its connection to the victim-impact evidence being presented. 128
Alternatively, jurors might associate real or imagined visual stimuli
122. See infra Part 1V.A.
123. See infra Part W.B.
124. See infra Part IV.C.
125. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571-72 (Cal. 2007).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 192-93 (D. Mass. 2004)
(finding a victim-impact video with "poignant" background music to be unduly prejudicial); see also
People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571-72 (permitting background music in a victim-impact video, but
cautioning that background music might add an "irrelevant factor" that only enhances emotions
and does not contribute to a fair factual presentation); State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 467 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2006) (reasoning that the background music in this victim-impact video was not unduly
inflammatory); Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 338-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (prohibiting a
victim-impact video with background music because the music "greatly amplifies the prejudicial
effect" of the video).
127. See Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 24.
128. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 70; Juslin & Vistiill, supra note 71, at 564; see
discussion supra Part III.B.
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with the musical presentation and experience emotions related to those
associations, rather than the victim-impact evidence at hand.129 Such
potential scenarios make the possible emotional impact of music in
victim-impact evidence highly unpredictable and quite risky. 130
One potential way to limit the emotional effects of background
music is through emotional regulation. 131 Originally developed for
judges, this approach may be adaptable to juror-specific
circumstances. 132 Emotional regulation suggests that by actively
engaging with emotions rather than suppressing them, legal actors can
"foster the desired emotional state." 133 They can use anticipatory
cognitive reappraisal to mentally prepare themselves for encountering
emotional stimuli, such as gruesome photos during evidence or a
particularly dramatic witness.
134
Evidence already suggests that even without formal legal
training, jurors might be able to engage in anticipatory cognitive
reappraisal, much like judges. 135 In one study, participants were
alerted to the probable impact of "emotionally provocative film clips or
slides" and instructed to "try [their] best to adopt a neutral attitude"
and "to think about [the slides] objectively and analytically rather than
129. See supra Part III.B.
130. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997) (raising the concern that emotions are too subjective and "irrational
and unpredictable" to yield consistent results).
131. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1485, 1504-10 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Emotional Regulation] (discussing suppression and
engagement strategies for emotional regulation). It should be noted that the effectiveness of
emotional regulation as a solution to the risk that musical emotions may be "unduly prejudicial"
is conditional on jurors being able to regulate musical emotions in a fashion similar to nonmusical
emotions.
132. See id. at 1514. The emotional regulation model was specifically developed for judges,
who cannot avoid interacting with emotional material and are responsible for screening the
material presented to the jury to ensure the jury only sees appropriate emotional stimuli. See id.
133. See id. at 1514, 1519.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1518. Maroney draws a parallel between the legal and medical professions,
pointing out that doctors, like judges, must deal with strong emotional stimuli such as injured
bodies or bodily fluids. See id. at 1517. Studies have shown that when instructed to approach a
potentially emotional, perhaps even gruesome, situation as a doctor would, untrained laypersons
appear to be able to effectively maintain a neutral and controlled emotional state for at least a
short duration. See id. at 1518. The fact that "laypersons appear able temporarily" to engage in
anticipatory cognitive reappraisal because they have "at least a basic sense of what is important
to a doctor" raises the possibility that jurors might also be able to engage in anticipatory cognitive
reappraisal because they have a sense of what is important to judges and the legal system. See id.
It should be noted, however, that there are still many questions about other potential problems
with applying emotional regulation to jurors. See infra note 145.
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as personally, or in any way, emotionally relevant to [them]. '"136 As a
result, the untrained participants were able to maintain a neutral
emotional response, even while viewing images of serious injuries.1 37
This study suggests that simple instructions alerting the jurors to the
anticipated emotional content and reminding them to view the material
objectively may offset any "unduly prejudicial" emotional responses.1 38
Arguably, the elements intrinsic to music are capable of being
filtered through an emotional-regulation model. 139 Although it is
impossible to instruct the jurors on every potential emotion-inducing
musical element, making the jurors aware that they will hear "sad" or
"reflective" music during the victim-impact evidence may be enough to
enable jurors to maintain a neutral emotional response. 140 Indeed, the
external factors of anticipation and social context may even support the
possibility of emotional regulation as an effective means of moderating
the other extrinsic risks posed by background music.1 4' Research on
anticipation indicates that when a listener anticipates a specific
emotional response, such as neutrality, that listener's experience of
music simply reinforces that predetermined emotion. 142
Furthermore, other research suggests that experiencing music
in a group both heightens the emotional response and pressures the
individuals to conform to the majority's expectation. 143 Thus, in a
situation where jurors have been advised in advance about the potential
emotional effect of the music used in victim-impact evidence and have
been instructed to remain neutral and objective, the group context may
assist in cultivating an atmosphere of emotional neutrality. 144
But background music may still fail the Payne standard. Even
if instructing jurors to engage in anticipatory cognitive reappraisal
successfully eliminated undue prejudice concerns, 145 background
136. See Maroney, Emotional Regulation, supra note 131, at 1515.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 68; Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 30-31.
140. See Maroney, Emotional Regulation, supra note 131, at 1518-19.
141. See Patrik N. Juslin, Emotional Responses to Music, in The Oxford Handbook of Music
Psychology 134-35 (Susan Hallman et al. eds, 2009).
142. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 71-72.
143. See SLOBODA, supra note 69, at 358; STORR, supra note 4, at 24, 30-31.
144. See SLOBODA, supra note 69, at 358; STORR, supra note 104, at 24, 30-31; Maroney,
Emotional Regulation, supra note 131, at 1518-19.
145. It should be noted that there are still substantial issues with the argument that
emotional regulation could be effectively implemented by jurors. Cf. Maroney, Emotional
Regulation, supra note 131, at 1490-94 (suggesting that judges may be able to effectively regulate
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music may not satisfy the first prong of the Payne standard,
which requires that victim-impact evidence reflect the
uniqueness of the victim or the blameworthiness of the defendant.
146
This dilemma highlights the issue with which courts have long
struggled-determining what function background music really serves
in victim-impact evidence.
147
One of the criticisms against the use of background music in
victim-impact evidence is that it promotes the cultural trend of
memorialization, which is not the appropriate legal purpose of
victim-impact evidence. 148 This raises an important legal question: as
cultural mourning rituals and technology evolve and victim-impact
evidence begins to mirror memorial videos, complete with photographs
of the victim and soft background music, how should courts respond?
149
If the social evolution of memorial videos has influenced
victim-impact videos, courts face the risk that victim-impact evidence
will idealize the victim, potentially distorting reality and biasing the
jury.150 Some critics argue that music contributes to this idealization
because the music is used primarily to "accentuate and underscore" key
emotional points. 15 1 While it could be argued that background music
actually reflects the victim's uniqueness by reinforcing aspects of the
victim's character or personality, or the feelings of the victim's family,
emotions, but not addressing the viability of jurors engaging in this same emotional regulation).
Most notably, there is no current research to affirm that such a neutral-observer instruction to
jurors would work with exposure to music as it has worked with exposure to visual images. Id.
Further, the fact that such de-biasing instructions are often ineffective for many mental processes
raises the question of whether emotional regulation would effectively work for musical emotions.
Id.
146. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
147. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571-72 (Cal. 2007) ("[T]he background music by
Enya may have added an irrelevant factor to the videotape. It had no connection to Sara other
than that her mother said it was some of Sara's favorite music. The Enya background music seems
unrelated to the images it accompanied and may have only added an emotional element to the
videotape.").
148. See Austin, supra note 10, at 987.
149. See id. at 985-86.
150. See id. at 988. For example, in the Kelly video the jurors saw pictures of a
"fresh-faced ... reserved, modest and shy" young woman who grew up in a loving home and whose
seemingly happy life was ended by the defendant now before the jury for sentencing. People v.
Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571. But "if there were a less rosy or dark side" to the victim's life, it likely would
not have been featured in family photos or the video being played before the jury. Austin, supra
note 10, at 990 (quoting People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 558).
151. Id.; see, e.g., Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (describing
how music is frequently used to reinforce the victim's story and can be "keyed to the various
visuals, sometimes soft and soothing, then swelling to a crescendo chorus").
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the line between music intended to manipulate the listener's emotions
and music intended to reflect on the character of the victim is blurry. 152
Thus, background music faces serious obstacles to satisfying the
Payne standard. 153 Without some sort of mechanism to neutralize the
emotional effects, background music consistently runs the risk of being
"unduly prejudicial." 15 4 But even if it were possible to successfully
argue that background music contributes to the overall reflection of the
victim's uniqueness or the defendant's blameworthiness by humanizing
the victim, the necessity of presenting the background music in a way
that is not "unduly prejudicial" strips the music of its relevance. 155 This
is precisely because any of the background music's relevance to the
victim-impact evidence is heavily dependent on the highly emotional
nature of the music. 156 For these reasons, any music that simply
functions as background music risks violating the Payne standard. 157
B. Victim-Created Music
Victim-created music shown to the jury in a video of the victim
actively performing presents a different situation from background
music. 158 The main point of showing the victim creating music is to
reflect something unique and relevant about the victim-a skill, a
personal interest, a way of interacting with the world.159 This deviates
sharply from background music because the music and any emotions
experienced as a result of victim-created music would be incidental to
the primary focus: demonstrating that, prior to the defendant's crime,
the victim made music. 160
In direct contrast to background music, victim-created music
clearly reflects the uniqueness of the victim. 161 In Kelly, the California
152. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994.
153. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 69-70 (discussing the emotional power of music); Cross
& Tolbert, supra note 8, at 31.
154. See DAVIES, supra note 88, at 69-70; Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 30-31.
155. See Austin, supra note 10, at 985-86.
156. See id.
157. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991) (acknowledging constitutional bar
to victim impact evidence that unduly prejudices the jury).
158. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994.
159. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250 (Md. 1995) (describing the State's
attempt to humanize the victim by introducing a ninety-second video of the victim playing the
piano).




Supreme Court differentiated general background music from
victim-created music, reasoning that although background music may
be irrelevant to the jury's evaluation of the victim's uniqueness or the
defendant's blameworthiness, victim-created music "seems relevant to
the purpose of demonstrating what she was like." 162 Other courts have
similarly found that victim-created music serves a legitimate purpose
in victim-impact evidence. 163 In Whittlesey v. State, the Maryland Court
of Appeals upheld the admission of a brief ninety-second video of the
victim playing the piano.164 The court reasoned that this clip gave the
victim, a well-known pianist, a "human dimension.., that was
ostensibly lacking in the other evidence." 165 In such situations, a
videotape captures this part of the victim's life in a way that still
photographs cannot. 166 Thus, victim-created music clearly satisfies the
first prong of Payne.16
7
Even under the second prong of Payne, victim-created music
clearly deviates from the more emotion-centric purpose of background
music and arguably does not "unduly prejudice" the jury. 168 Certainly,
victim-created music will contain intrinsic musical factors that could
affect jurors' emotions. 169 But, as previously discussed, the full
implication of these elements is highly variable, depending on what
music is created and whether music alone has the power to affect
emotions, as the receptive model suggests. 170 Current theorists of
music and emotions have adopted the constructive model, which
instead suggests that the full emotional impact of victim-created music
will depend on the "contexts within which music is produced and
received." 171
162. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571 (Cal. 2007). The clip in Kelly illustrated to the jury
facts about the victim's life-how she was a shy young girl who sang a solo in front of her
classmates. Id. The court even observed that the "choice of song to sing at that age and in those
circumstances also seems relevant to forming an impression of the victim." Id.
163. E.g., Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 250-51 (upholding the trial court's admission of victim-
created music as relevant evidence).
164. Id. at 250.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 251.
167. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (allowing victim-impact evidence
that provides information about the victim and the impact of the victim's loss on family).
168. See Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 31 (exploring the link between music and
identity), see also Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 250 (discussing the ability of victim-created music to
satisfy the Payne standard, as acknowledged by the Appellant); cf. DAVIES, supra note 88, at 62.
169. See Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 143-45.
170. See supra Part I1.
171. Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 29.
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Because jurors will be hearing victim-created music in the very
specific context of victim-impact evidence shown during the sentencing
phase of the defendant's trial, the jury's likely response to
victim-created music will be very different from its response to
background music. 172 Most notably, jurors will not anticipate
victim-created music moving them in the same way that jurors might
anticipate background music affecting them. 173 Background music
serves cultural expectations of emotionality and is normally not
integral to the substantive content of victim-impact evidence aside from
the emotional energy it reflects. 174 On the other hand, victim-created
music has no preconceived emotional role. 175 Even if victims or their
families choose musical excerpts to elicit certain emotional responses
from jurors, those selections would be limited by the musical choices the
victim made as a musician prior to the crime; they would necessarily
communicate a "human dimension" unique to that victim. 176 Moreover,
jurors will anticipate that the photographs and videos relate to the
purpose of victim-impact evidence-highlighting the victim's
uniqueness or the harm the defendant caused-and will interpret the
emotional meaning of victim-created music within this context. 177
Any prior conditioning or visual associations unique to
individual jurors are less problematic here, given the weight of social
and group contexts surrounding the proceedings, which are likely to
reinforce the anticipated emotional framework and purpose of
victim-impact evidence. 178 Unlike background music, victim-created
music is expressly linked to the victim performing the music, not
abstractly related to the content of the victim-impact evidence or a
popular recording that the jurors may have heard before in a different
context. 179 Even if the music being performed by the victim is familiar
to a juror, it is still distinct because the victim's unique performance
172. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
173. See Austin, supra note 10, at 984-85 (discussing trend of using particularly poignant
background music in memorial and victim impact videos); Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 31.
174. See Austin, supra note 10, at 984-85.
175. See id. at 994.
176. Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250 (Md. 1995) (describing the State's attempt to
humanize the victim by introducing a ninety-second video of the victim playing the piano).
177. See Cross & Tolbert, supra note 8, at 31 (pointing out that once a listener has formed
expectations about a musical experience, the listener will interpret any musical emotions or cues
to fit within the anticipated framework).
178. See supra Part III.B.2.
179. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994.
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will necessarily differ from other performances of the music.180 Finally,
in the case of video footage, the direct link between the jurors hearing
victim-created music and seeing the visual image of the victim in the
act of creating the music will serve as a strong reminder of the purpose
of the music within the context.181 Thus, most victim-created music
likely falls within the Payne standard, as it reflects the uniqueness of
the victim and is not "unduly prejudicial."
18 2
C. Victim-Specific Music
While background music typically fails the Payne standard and
victim-created music usually satisfies the Payne standard, music that
has some special significance to the victim but is not performed by the
victim falls somewhere in the murky middle.18 3 Victim-specific music
may say something relevant about the victim by showing the jury what
kind of music the victim enjoyed or highlighting the victim's
relationship with others, but it also contains some of the risks
associated with background music.184
The main concern underlying victim-specific music under
Payne's first prong is that its contribution to showing the victim's
uniqueness may not be clearly discernible, making the risk too great
that music-induced emotions would be prejudicial. 1 5 This is a fair
concern given that victim-specific music will function much the same as
background music.18 6 The only difference is that the music playing in
the background allegedly has some specific connection to the victim.
1 8 7
Thus, many of the concerns raised about background music-such as
the fear that external factors like conditioning or visual association will
influence the jurors' emotions-apply to victim-specific music as well.188
180. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part III.B.2. Jurors viewing victim-impact evidence anticipate that the
presented information relates to the victim's uniqueness or the defendant's blameworthiness. See
supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text. The combination of that anticipated emotional
response to the content presented, which arguably includes music, with the direct visual link
provided through a video clip of the victim creating music and the social context of the courtroom
distinguishes victim-created music from background music. See supra Part 1V.B.
182. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991).
183. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994-95.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571 (Cal. 2007).
186. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994-95.
187. See id.
188. See supra Part V.A.
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One possible distinction in victim-specific music that
strengthens its relevance is the difference between the victim's favorite
music and music that meaningfully reflects a relationship the victim
had with others in her life. 189 Although the victim's mother in Kelly
said that Enya was some of the victim's favorite music, the court
remained concerned about the relevance of the music balanced against
the added emotional risk. 190 Even if the music was a particular favorite
of the victim, it is unclear what exact emotional message is conveyed to
the jury and whether the song is merely an additional emotional ploy. 191
But music that reflects a particular relationship between the victim and
a family member or friend may be more relevant as it is concretely tied
to the story being conveyed in the victim-impact evidence. 192 Notably,
however, the connection between victim-specific music and the story
conveyed in victim-impact evidence through photographs and narration
is still not as clear as it is with victim-created music. 193
Emotional regulation might be a viable solution to mitigate risks
that victim-specific music would "unduly prejudice" the victim,
particularly given that victim-specific music shares the same risks as
background music. 194 Where background music failed under the Payne
standard, victim-specific music succeeds. 195 Emotional regulation
stripped background music of its relevance, which was largely wrapped
up in its emotional content. 196 In contrast, emotional regulation here
would simply highlight the relevance of victim-specific music by taking
the focus off of jurors' subjective emotional associations and refocusing
it on the musical selection's relevance to the victim's uniqueness,
personality, and life. 197
Even if victim-specific music reflects the victim's uniqueness,
however, it still must not be "unduly prejudicial" under Payne's second
prong. 198 In Kelly, the Supreme Court of California attributed no
probative significance to the fact that Enya was one of the victim's
189. See Austin, supra note 10, at 995.
190. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571.
191. See id. at 571-72.
192. See Austin, supra note 10, at 995.
193. See id. at 994-95.
194. See supra Part W.A.
195. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571-72.
196. See supra Part V.A.
197. See Maroney, Emotional Regulation, supra note 131, at 1515.
198. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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favorite artists.199 Other scholars, however, have argued that music
reflecting "the victim's musical tastes, musical appreciation, or
performance activities" should be permitted in victim-impact evidence
because it can have "genuine probative value." 200  To ensure the
relevance of victim-specific music, Professor Regina Austin advocates
that courts should make "[t]he link between the victim's individuality
and character and her or his choice of music ... explicit."20 1 Expressly
acknowledging the source of the victim-specific music will mitigate,
though not eliminate, the risks associated with subjective musical
material. 2
02
Thus, while victim-specific music has a higher risk of becoming
"unduly prejudicial" than victim-created music, it is not necessarily
"unduly prejudicial" and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 0 3
If a court finds that victim-specific music is prejudicial or that jurors
would not be able to effectively regulate their emotions, that court can
strike the music from victim-impact evidence under the Payne
standard. 20 4 But a per se ban against victim-specific music goes too far,




Judges should not exclude music from victim-impact evidence
simply because it can be emotional. Rather, the current
music-and-emotion literature and an analysis of the various uses of
music in victim-impact evidence under the Payne standard reveal that
some music has probative value to the jury. While background music
of no particular relevance to the victim should not satisfy the Payne
199. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571-72 (Cal. 2007) (reasoning that it would be unlikely
that the music held any probative value because it "seems unrelated to the images it accompanied
and may have only added an emotional element to the videotape").
200. See Austin, supra note 10, at 994.
201. Id. at 994-95.
202. See id. at 995.
203. See id. at 1015 (recommending case-by-case evaluations of victim impact evidence in
pre-admissibility hearings).
204. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-27 (1991).
205. See People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 571-72 (Cal. 2007) (recognizing that the video clip
of the victim performing music in the victim-impact video added relevant, probative content);
Austin, supra note 10, at 994 (reasoning that music reflecting "the victim's musical tastes, musical
appreciation, or performance activities" can have probative value). But see Harden, supra note 3,
at 876 (arguing that a bright-line rule is necessary).
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standard, victim-created music should satisfy it because it clearly
reflects the uniqueness of the victim and is not "unduly prejudicial."
Judges should evaluate victim-specific music on a case-by-case basis
given that it illustrates the victim's personality and life and it is not
necessarily "unduly prejudicial." By carefully examining the function
of music in victim-impact evidence, a court can protect a defendant from
facing an improperly prejudiced jury while still ensuring that




206. Cf. People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d at 571; DAVIES, supra note 88, at 62.
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